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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
ALBERT E. UTTON*
Perhaps the most important New Mexico administrative law casein a number of years was handed down May 21, 1975, by theSupreme Court. The case, De Vargas Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Camp-bell,1 established a new law of standing to challenge governmental
actions other than expenditures,2 and in so doing expressly overruled
cases setting a stricter standard.3
Professor Walden has dealt with this case elsewhere in this survey
of New Mexico legal developments. 4 However, briefly examining the
exact language of the court in De Vargas is worthwhile. The court
specifically stated "[w] e hold that to attain standing in a suit arguingthe unlawfulness of governmental action, the complainant must
allege that he is injured in fact or is imminently threatened with
injury, economically or otherwise." '
This statement greatly liberalizes the law of standing in NewMexico. It should facilitate the attempts of environmentalists, con-
sumers, and other citizens seeking to challenge the lawfullness of
governmental actions.
However, the quoted language can be misleading in that it appears
to overstate the precise intention of the court. The court certainlyintended to liberalize the law of standing, but it is unlikely that the
mere allegation by the complainant that he or she is injured in fact
will be sufficient to grant standing except when the motion in
opposition is on the pleadings alone.
The complainant will have to make a showing suitable to theprocedural posture of the challenge of some injury in fact beyond
the mere allegation of injury in fact or imminent threat of injury.That this is the court's intention is indicated at the end of its
*Professor of Law, University of New Mexico.
1. 87 N.M. 469, 535 P.2d 1320 (1975).2. For a discussion of taxpayer standing, see Utton, Through a Glass Darkly: The Law ofStanding to Challenge Governmental Action in New Mexico, 2 N.M. L. Rev. 172 (1972).3. The court specifically said, "We therefore overrule Ruidoso State Bank v. Brumlow
... and its progenny (sic), Southern Union Gas Co. v. New Mexico Pub. Serv. Com'n., 82N.M. 405, 482 P.2d 913 (1971), and Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., v. City of Albuquerque,82 N.M. 164, 477 P.2d 604 (1970)." 87 N.M. 469, 473, 535 P.2d 1320, 1324 (1975).4. See discussion at , supra.
5. 87 N.M. 469, 473, 535 P.2d 1320, 1324 (1975).
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opinion, which says that this new standard "should grant standing to
those having legitimate interests while allowing the ordinary sum-
mary judgment procedures to be used to penetrate the allegations of
the pleadings to determine whether injury in fact actually exists."
6
The court quoted with approval Goodman v. Brock' to the effect
that "[t] he procedures provided by Rule 56, supra, serve a worth-
while purpose in disposing of groundless claims or claims which
cannot be proved without putting the parties and the courts through
the trouble and expense of full blown trials on these claims."
8 Thus,
the standard for standing to challenge the lawfulness of government
action in New Mexico, established by De Vargas, requires the com-
plainant to make a showing "that he is injured in fact or is
imminently threatened with injury, economically or otherwise" suffi-
cient to withstand a challenge for summary judgment.
The right of parties before an administrative agency to discover
and introduce evidence was clarified by the Court of Appeals in In re
Miller.9 This case involved appeals from four county evaluation pro-
test board decisions, one from Lincoln County and three from
Bernalillo County. The cases were consolidated because they pre-
sented similar questions. In each case the evaluation protest board
excluded evidence offered by the taxpayer, and the Lincoln County
evaluation protest board also denied the right to discovery by deposi-
tion. In the Lincoln County case the taxpayer was refused permission
to take the depositions of the county appraiser and a member of the
State Reappraisal Department to determine how the contested assess-
ment was made. The Court of Appeals held that exclusion of the
offered evidence and denial of the deposition request denied the
taxpayer a fair hearing, and therefore, constituted a denial of due
process.
Of interest is the use the court made of the Administrative Proce-
dures Act of New Mexico. 1 ° The court correctly pointed out that
the Administrative Procedures Act does not expressly apply to hear-
ings before county evaluation protest boards because "such hearings
have not been placed under the Act by law."'
' After noting that
"[ii t has been suggested that the Legislature has a duty to make the
Act applicable to all public agencies to protect the public," the court
6. Id. at 474, 535 P.2d at 1325 (1975).
7. 83 N.M. 789, 498 P.2d 676 (1972).
8. Id. at 793, 498 P.2d at 680 (1972).
9. 88 N.M. 492, 542 P.2d 1182 (Ct. App. 1975), cert denied, N.M. , , P.2d
(1975).
10. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 4-32-1 et seq. (Repl. 1974).
11. In re Miller, 88 N.M. at , 542 P.2d at 1186; see also Mayer v. Public Employees
Retirement Bd., 81 N.M. 64, 65, 463 P.2d 40, 41 (Ct. App. 1970).
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said, "in any case, the Act demonstrates that depositions are permis-
sible under administrative law, to assist the agency and other parties
in obtaining a fair hearing."' 2 Thus, the court, although recognizing
that the Administrative Procedures Act may not apply to a particular
agency,'1 3 nonetheless used the Act as a source of administrative law
to demonstrate that depositions are useful in agency practice.
This development is somewhat reminiscent of the United States
Supreme Court's reasoning in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath. '" In that
case the Supreme Court looked to the federal Administrative Pro-
cedures Act' ' to define the nature of the hearing required by due
process under the U.S. Constitution. The Court said that due process
required a hearing. The purpose of the federal Administrative Pro-
cedures Act, to provide fair and uniform procedures for federal
agencies, was noted by the Court in requiring that the agency in
question provide a hearing like that defined in Section 5 of the
A.P.A. This added to the constitution by accretion; it incorporated
by reference Section 5 of the Administrative Procedures Act into the
constitutional definition of due process. The Court thus appeared to
be saying that, even if the Administrative Procedures Act were
repealed, due process under the constitution would require that the
basic procedural safeguards provided in the Act would have to be
honored by an agency in similar cases.
In each of the four New Mexico cases the taxpayer offered
evidence which appeared reasonably to relate to the question of the
proper evaluation of the property. In the Lincoln County case the
taxpayer owned a horserace track. He offered evidence of valuations
for prior years, copies of tax schedules covering the land owned and
used by horsetracks in the state and comparable land values. In the
Bernalillo County cases the taxpayers, who owned shopping centers
and vacant land, offered evidence of valuations of comparable
properties. In each case the board excluded the proffered evidence.
The Court of Appeals noted that the "technical rules of
evidence... do not apply at protest hearings before the county
protest board ... .'" 6 It correctly pointed out that the reason for
not applying the technical rules is not to exclude evidence, but is
quite the opposite-to make it easier to introduce evidence before an
12. 88 N.M. at ,542 P.2d at 1186.
13. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 4-32-2(A) (Repl. 1966). The Human Rights Commission has
been required by the legislature to place itself under the Act by its own rule. No other state
agency has been placed under the Act.
14. 339 U.S. 33 (1950), modified, 339 U.S. 908 (1950).
15. 5 U.S.C. § § 551-59 (1967).
16. 88 N.M. at , 542 P.2d at 1187, quoting from N.M. Stat. Ann. § 72-2-39.1(A)
(Spec. Supp. 1975).
May 1976]
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
administrative agency.' 7 Thus, the court held, exclusion of evidence
and denial of discovery through deposition constituted a denial of
due process because it inhibited the appellant's right to be heard and
to present an adequate defense.
Miller is significant, therefore, because it prohibits agencies from
arbitrarily excluding evidence in an administrative hearing and
affirms the right under the due process clause of parties to take
depositions as provided in the New Mexico Administrative Proce-
dures Act, even though the Act does not apply to the particular
agency in question. Since the Administrative Procedures Act does
not expressly apply to most state agencies, the due process clause
may become a primary vehicle for getting evidence before an agency.
17. See, Utton, How to Stand Still Without Really Trying: A Critique of the New Mexico
Administrative Procedures Act, 10 Nat. Res. J. 840, 848 (1970).
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